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The gans from reform and lberalsaton of servces have attracted a growng lterature. messerln and Zedllo (2004) , for example, note the effect of servce sector reform on competton, market scale, dversty, lower prces and hgher qualty, as well as the capacty to remove bottlenecks to growth n the nfrastructure sector. They remark on the contrbuton of servces to export performance, and they stress the nterests of developng economes n market access for servces exports.
Polcy reform n servces that delvers these benefits has a wder scope than reform programs n the goods sectors. There are servces polcy measures that apply only to foregners: for example, rules on the form n whch they can enter local markets. servces markets are also regulated by measures such as lcensng, whch affect all supplers, wherever they come from. As Whalley (2004) observes n hs revew of emprcal work on the effects of servces lberalsaton n developng economes, 'one s talkng of domestc regulaton, entry barrers, portablty of provders, competton polcy regmes more so than barrers at natonal borders, as wth tarffs' (Whalley 2004:1,250) . The connectons between regulatory reform and servces trade lberalsaton are examned n detal n mattoo and sauve (2003) .
The scope of the servces agenda also dffers from that of goods because of the substtutablty between the modes of supply: that s, delvery of the servce through establshment n the customer country, through the movement of people (ether consumers or provders) or through the cross-border modes of supply-optons for whch are expandng through technologcal change. cross-border supply s the mode most smlar to trade n goods.
The archtects of the GATs recognsed the value of consderng all the modes of supply and all the mpedments that appled to those modes. They sought commtments n the GATs to open up sectors and modes of supply and to elmnate measures that lmt entry by all supplers and those whch dscrmnate aganst foregn supplers. studes of servces reform have examned these varous dmensons. some concentrate on the removal of dscrmnatory polcy n a lmted range of modes of supply, such as that across borders (Francos and spnanger 2001) . others stress the value of coverage of other modes of supply (Whalley 2004; Walmsley and Wnters 2003) . some examne the dfferent mpacts of the removal of dscrmnatory polcy (that s, mplementaton of the prncple of natonal treatment) compared wth reform of polcy affectng entry to markets by all servces supplers (n GATs language, matters of market access) (dee and hanslow 2000a, 2000b) .
servces sector polcymakers are confronted by questons of whch sectors are the prortes for reform, whch modes of supply should be ncluded and to what extent should commtments refer to natonal treatment and market access questons? more specfically, they must decde whether domestc markets should be deregulated before foregn supplers are allowed to enter, whether these reforms should be carred out smultaneously or whether foregn firms should be able to enter whle mpedments reman to domestc entry.
The first step n ths chapter s to characterse optons for servces sector polcy change n broad terms, and to dscuss what factors determne the drecton of change. some of the ponts derved from the framework are llustrated by reference to chna's experence n servces, whch offers many lessons. chna made substantal commtments to reform ts servces sector, as part of ts WTo accesson. mattoo (2004) revews the sgnficance of these reforms and notes how extensve they are compared wth the experence of even ndustralsed economy commtments n the WTo (see also WTo 2006: Table AiV .2, for a summary of chna's accesson commtments). The commtments made are now beng mplemented. The constructon of the orgnal commtments and the pattern of ther mplementaton are a source of nsght for other polcymakers contendng wth a smlar task.
optons for servces sector reform are presented n the next secton. one s to free up entry to domestc supplers. Another s to open markets to all supplers. These are referred to below as 'domestc deregulaton' and 'lberalsaton' respectvely. There are other outcomes, called 'foregn rent seekng' and 'back-sldng'. some comment s offered on the welfare mplcatons of each of these.
chna's experence of servces sector reform s then reconsdered. some comments are offered on the relatve mportance of varous aspects of the polcy and poltcal economy frameworks. That dscusson ncludes reference to reform n the financal servces, transport, dstrbuton and telecommuncatons sectors. The chapter concludes wth some key ponts and a suggeston for further emprcal work that s relevant to these questons.
Options for reform
many mpedments to entry nto servces markets apply to domestc and foregn producers, and n some cases foregn producers face extra requrements. An ndex of polcy restrctveness has been developed to assess the mportance of both types of restrctons, followng the work of Warren (2000), Fndlay et al. (2002) and mcGure and Fndlay (2005) . The ndex s a frequency measure that estmates the restrctveness of an economy's tradng regme based on the trade barrer framework developed for the GATs.
Under the GATs framework, trade mpedments are classfied nto two prmary categores.
1 market access. The GATs dentfied four modes of supply for trade n servces: that s, cross-border, consumpton abroad, commercal presence and presence of natural person. market access represents the restrctons on market entry by ether of the four supply modes on natonal and foregn new entrants (Warren 2000) .
2 Natonal treatment. Natonal treatment oblgatons requre GATs members to dentfy all measures that dscrmnate aganst foregn servces supplers n terms of advantages gven to domestc supplers or extra regulatory requrements mposed on foregn supplers.
Followng the GATs framework, the first step s to classfy trade restrctons nto two prmary categores.
• establshment. The ablty of servces supplers to establsh a physcal outlet n a terrtory and supply servces through those outlets, whch ncludes market entry va foregn nvestment. Ths runs parallel wth the mode of commercal presence n the GATs.
• contnung. The operatons of a servces suppler after t has entered the market, ncludng an nterconnecton regme, or ts equvalent, and cross-border supples. regulatory measures that foster and enhance competton would also be captured under ths category. The second step s to reclassfy trade restrctons nto dscrmnatory and non-dscrmnatory categores to capture the degree of complance wth natonal treatment oblgatons.
• Non-dscrmnatory. restrcton appled to domestc and foregn servces supplers equally.
• dscrmnatory. restrctng only foregn or only domestc servces supplers. Table 6 .1 provdes an example of how restrctons n telecommuncatons are classfied under the ndex. The ndex value s then calculated for each economy usng a methodology of scores and weghts. scores are assgned for each lberalsaton ndex on the bass of a judgment about ts strngency. The more strngent the restrcton, the hgher s the score. For example, a country that restrcts the number of fixed-lne lcences s assgned a hgher score than an economy that ssues several new lcences.
The restrcton categores are then weghted together accordng to a judgment about ther relatve economc cost. For example, n telecommuncatons, restrctons on the ssuance of lcences are weghted more heavly than restrctons on leased-lne operatons. The weghts are chosen so that the total restrctveness ndex score ranges from zero to one. An ndex score s calculated separately for domestc and foregn servces supplers (Fgure 6.1). A foregn ndex (F) s calculated to measure all the restrctons that hnder foregn firms from enterng and operatng n an economy. it covers dscrmnatory and non-dscrmnatory restrctons. A domestc ndex (d) represents restrctons that are appled to domestc firms and t generally covers only non-dscrmnatory restrctons. The dfference between the foregn and domestc ndex scores s a measure of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Ths classficaton of the restrctons suggests a number of paths for reform, whch can be specfied. For example, F and d could be reduced at the same rate, or by the same amounts n absolute terms, or one could be reduced faster than the other. These optons are llustrated n Fgure 6.2. The horzontal axs represents the sze of the domestc ndex (d). The vertcal axs shows the sze of the gap between F and d-that s, the extent of dscrmnaton. The maxmum value of the d axs s shown as one.
1 At pont o, the value of d s zero, and the maxmum value of (F-d) s one. There s an addtonal constrant snce the value of F s also, at most, equal to one. Gven any value of d, the value of (F-d) must therefore le on or below the lne XY: for any value of d, a pont along XY mples an ndex value for F of one. Economy X
Trade restrictiveness index
The restrictiveness index measures the number and severity of restrictions on trade in services for foreign and domestic services suppliers. The foreign and domestic indices include restrictions on establishment and ongoing operations. Index scores generally range from 0 to 1. The higher the score the more restrictive an economy.
Foreign index

Domestic index
A measure of nondiscriminatory restrictions on all service suppliers.
Source: mcGure, G., 2003. 'methodologes for measurng restrctons on trade n servces', n organsaton for economc co-operaton and development (ed.), Quantifying the Benefits of Liberalising Trade in Services, organsaton for economc co-operaton and development, Pars.
suppose the current polcy leads to a stuaton n whch the ndex values of F-d and d le at pont A. in that case, there are four man optons for polcy change (notng that movement nto the area XYZ s not possble).
one opton (or lberalsaton) s reform n whch d and the margn of dscrmnaton are reduced and pont A moves nto the space ocAB. if the rato of (F-d) to d s mantaned, the reducton would take place along the lne oA, whle above that lne the proportonate reducton n d exceeds that n (F-d).
Another opton s domestc deregulaton, n whch d s reduced but F-d ncreases. in ths case, A moves nto the area AcXe. The value of F does not necessarly ncrease but wll do so f pont A moves nto the space AhXe.
Another opton s that pont A moves nto the space BAJY, n whch the extent of dscrmnaton falls but the restrctons on domestc entry rse (when d moves to the rght of BA). Ths case could be called foregn rent seekng, snce foregn supplers emerge wth a relatvely less restrcted poston compared wth domestc supplers. The effect of the polcy change could, however, also be to ncrease the value of F (the total value of the ndex confrontng foregners), when the pont A moves nto the space AJYG. There are some other mportant specal cases.
• Along the lne Ac, the extent of dscrmnaton remans constant whle restrctons on domestc entry fall. Ths could be called market access reform, n terms of the language of the GATs, snce restrctons to foregn and domestc entry are beng decreased by the same amount (although F-d-that s, the margn of dscrmnaton-s constant).
• Along the lne AB, the extent of restrctons on domestc entry remans constant but there s a reducton n the extent of dscrmnaton. in terms of the language of the GATs, ths could be referred to as reform n the drecton of natonal treatment, snce (F-d) s beng reduced, whle other unversally appled mpedments to entry stay the same.
The emprcal work on the benefits of servces reform tends to focus on the mpact of removal of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Francos and spnanger (2001) , for example, examned the effects of chna's WTo accesson. Ther model ncluded a number of servces sectors. chna's servces polcy was charactersed by mplct tarff rates derved from gravty equatons n whch hong kong's relatonshps were used as the benchmarks. The gap between real and expected mports, accordng to ths benchmark, was used wth an estmate of an mport demand elastcty, to estmate a prce effect of the polcy (akn to a tarff that would have the same effect of reducng mports relatve to ther free trade level). The data were therefore based on servces that were traded across borders (not ncludng those delvered through commercal presence). Further, the measures they assessed ncluded polcy that affected foregn relatve to domestc supply, that s, the (F-d) margn. The modellng results, therefore, n terms of Fgure 6.2, refer to a movement along the AB lne, but wth respect only to operatons, not to establshment. The results, therefore, capture only part of the reforms made by chna n the context of ts GATs commtments. 2 emprcal work on the effects of servces reform can solate the contrbuton of reform n these dfferent drectons, though so far at the expense of a narrower sectoral coverage. For example, dee and hanslow (2000b) provde some modellng results that classfy polcy measures n the manner llustrated n Table 6.1. They find that removng restrctons on market access causes much larger gans than reductons n dscrmnaton-partly, ths s because of the sze of the reductons n restrctons on market access.
The experience in China
chna had already made substantal changes to polcy n many servces sectors before 2001 and ts accesson to the WTo led to further development of that polcy. our nterest here s whether these two steps were n the same or dfferent drectons, and how the negotatng process has affected the drecton of change. chna's servces reform commtments are revewed also by mattoo (2004) and Whalley (2003) .
As observed n the cases to follow, chna had n many cases already embarked on a reform program before the WTo accesson negotatons had been resolved-but were those changes n the form of lberalsaton, as defined n Fgure 6.2, or were they a form of domestc deregulaton? To see ths, we examne the stuaton n bankng, nsurance, transport, dstrbuton and telecommuncatons.
Telecommuncatons dramatc changes have occurred n the telecommuncatons market, but the man drvers appear to have been the consequences of technologcal change.
Pangestu and mrongowus (2004) revew chna's experence n the telecommuncatons sector. They report sgnficant prce reductons and ncreases n tele-densty snce 1998. These changes obvously occurred n advance of WTo accesson. Pangestu and mrongowus attrbute these changes to competton n telecommuncatons markets, but they stress that the government orchestrated ths competton and prce reducton. in addton, there were nstances of the nfluence of technologcal advancement that overcame government control, such as the use of the internet for telephone calls.
Whle chna's rate of reform n telecommuncatons has been rapd, t remans an outler. Fndlay et al. (2002) , n a sub-sample of Asa-Pacfic economc cooperaton (APec) countres, find that the extent of lberalsaton n chna exceeds that n all other countres revewed. But they also note that despte the rapd change, chna's degree of openness remans less than the sample average.
Accordng to the WTo accesson commtments (revewed by Pangestu and mrongowus 2004), foregn nvestment was allowed to enter but ntally at a lower ownershp level and wth geographcal restrctons. in a certan perod-two years for value-added servces, five years for moble telephony and sx years for domestc and nternatonal servces-the geographcal restrctons were to be removed. Foregn ownershp caps were to be removed gradually accordng to a schedule runnng through the next few years: the removal of ths restrcton has been accelerated, although the 50 per cent celng stll apples. The chnese authortes reaffirmed n 2006 ther decson to ncrease the foregn partcpaton cap n jont ventures for basc servces (fixed-lned and moble) to 49 per cent by 2007, n lne wth chna's WTo commtments (WTo 2006) . even after accesson, foregn nvestment s not ntended to hold a majorty n the sector, although the treatment of foregn entry s more lberal n valueadded servces than for the other two sub-sectors. Geographcal restrctons also contnue to apply, ncludng to some extent to domestc firms. in may 2002, chna Telecom-the former monopoly n fixed-lne operatons-was splt nto two enttes along provncal lnes, wth chna Telecom servng 21 provnces n the south and the newly created chna Netcom servng 10 northern provnces. Both operators enjoy the rght to compete n each other's terrtores. These two share about 95 per cent of the market (WTo 2006). Two mnor domestc supplers-chna Uncom and chna TeTong-have also entered the fixed-lne market wth a lmted presence. The major operators n basc telecommuncatons n chna are state owned, and ths stuaton s unlkely to change even n the short term. The man ssue, however, s not the presence of government ownershp but whether the few and predomnantly state-owned players wll be operatng n a compettve envronment. Ths ncreases the mportance of chna meetng ts commtments to establsh an ndependent regulatory body. instead of havng a separate regulatory agency, the mnstry of electronc industres (mii) remans as the polcymakng body as well as the sectoral regulator. Whle accordng to chna's own statement, the mii wll act as an mpartal and ndependent regulator (WTo 2006:232) chna's experence can be compared wth that of Tawan. Tawan's experence s a movement nto ocAB, that s, lberalsaton-and ths s the more common case, whch s observed also n hong kong, Japan and korea, for example (Fgure 6.4). Whle dscrmnatory measures persst, Tawan's lberalsaton pattern s hghlghted by the non-dscrmnatory and smultaneous lberalsaton approach. specfically, Fgure 6.4 shows that the ndex value for Tawan mgrates from pont A-whch s the orgnal value n the base year-nto the space ocAB. it also demonstrates that the level of dscrmnaton between domestc and foregn supplers remans when restrctons for domestc firms are removed completely by 2007. 
China
on dong busness n local currency for local ctzens and lmts on foregn nvestment n chnese banks (25 per cent n total and 20 per cent for any one nvestor). These restrctons were consstent wth the stagng process lad out n the GATs commtments, but t was ponted out that domestc banks dd not face the geographcal and customer restrctons that were faced by wholly foregn-owned banks. many of these restrctons were, however, to be removed n 2006. other ssues are 'exorbtant captal requrements and slow lcenceapproval processes' that lmt the growth of branch networks (delays of up to one year are reported and bases are evdent n the allocaton of lcences for nteror ctes).
on 11 december 2006, chna dd ndeed announce that foregn banks could offer renmnb servces to local consumers (chna 2006). regonal restrctons were also removed. Foregn-owned banks would be treated the same as domestc banks. Foregn banks could also ncorporate a local legal entty from ths tme, however, the caps on ownershp n domestc banks reman: the ssue then becomes the rate at whch foregn entrants can establsh a branch network. more mportant n the near future s lkely to be the debate about foregn bank access to electronc payment systems, although ths s an ssue for local and foregn banks. The Us coalton of servces industres (Uscsi 2007) reports that foregn electronc payment cards cannot be ssued by any bank, local or foregn, unless they are branded wth chna UnonPay, the monopoly domestc electronc payments processor. There s debate about whether or not ths requrement s consstent wth the december 2006 GATs commtments. Table A6 .2. insurance changes n nsurance polces n chna are compared wth those n other countres for the perod 1997-2004 n Fgure 6.5, whch shows the changes n (rather than the levels of) (F-d) and d. Ths figure was reported by dee and dnh (2007), who ponted out that, for many countres, the polcy change n ths perod was relatvely small. chna, however, s one of the outlers, along wth inda. chna's reform was drven by ts WTo accesson, but inda's was drven by unlateral acton. in chna's case, sgnficant contrbutors to reform were the removal of economc needs tests and quanttatve restrctons on the ssuance of lcences for foregn firms, a wdenng of the scope of busness that foregn nsurers could undertake and a gradual reducton n the proporton of busness that had to be rensured wth a nomnated domestc rensurer.
The Uscsi (2007) ponts out that a number of mpedments reman n the nsurance sector, ncludng a dfferental approach to approvng branches for foregn and domestc companes, delays n approval of applcatons to convert foregn-owned branches to subsdares, excessve captalsaton requrements for new branches or subsdares, a hgh qualfyng threshold for companes to nvest ther foregn exchange captal n overseas funds or equtes (apples also to domestc firms), a rule that says provders that have held lcences for more than eght years (whch rules out foregn companes enterng the market snce WTo accesson) can set up nsurance asset management companes, protecton for domestc rensurers and dfferental treatment of companes that nvested n chna before or after ts WTo accesson. Transport in many cases, the domestc markets for road transport, nland water transport, forwardng, storage and warehousng and courer servces had already been deregulated. WTo commtments then extended that polcy to foregn entry, though the polcy change was not usually appled mmedately (for detals see luo and Fndlay 2004) . it was nstead accordng to a schedule and wth restrctons on the form of foregn entry. Wth the exceptons of ar transport (whch s dscussed n more detal below) and nternal water transport, the mpact of the commtments at the tme of accesson and n the medum termas commtments to hgher levels of foregn ownershp are phased n-wll be sgnficant. even the relatvely closed ral sector wll be open to foregn entry under chna's WTo commtments. The strategy n logstcs, n other words, has been first a movement to domestc deregulaton followed by a reducton n the dscrmnaton aganst foregners. luo and Fndlay (2004) stress the effect of lberalsaton on process nnovaton. They note that the demand for ntegrated logstcs servces-that s, those provded by so-called thrd-party logstcs firms-s ncreasng. These firms try to provde and control the whole chan of servces. They need to have access to all the relevant lcences, whch could nclude nternatonal freght forwardng, dfferent modes of transportaton (ar, nternatonal shppng, domestc shppng, road, ral), storage and warehousng, contaner staton and depot servces, as well as courer servces. The openng up of the dfferent sectors n logstcs, luo and Fndlay argue, would have a sgnficant mpact on the ablty of thrd-party logstcs firms to provde the whole chan of servces. some foregn and domestc firms that orgnally had restrcted access to some lnks of the servces (for example, nternatonal freght forwardng) wll develop ntegrated servces after the restrctons are lfted. The commtment to allow fully foregn-owned nternatonal freght forwardng operatons was mplemented n rules ssued n december 2005. Accordng to the Uscsi, a problem remans n the applcaton of the regulatons: t says that ts experence has been that wholly foregn-owned firms have been unable to obtan a lcence that allows then to book cargo space on arlnes wthn chna or operatng nternatonally.
The arlne sector provdes an example of domestc deregulaton: the polcy on foregn entry has remaned restrctve whle restrctons on entry to domestc routes have been relaxed (Zhang and chen 2003) .
The first steps n reform of the ar transport sector n chna nvolved the separaton of commercal operatons from government. Ths process began n 1987, when sx key state-owned arlnes were separated from regonal admnstraton bureaux, whle the entry of new operators was encouraged. The man carrers tended, however, to have a regonal specalsaton.
The only source of captal for these arlnes ntally was government fundng, but ths constrant was relaxed n 1993 and the sector was opened to foregn nvestment wth some remanng restrctons on foregn control (stll at a maxmum of 49 per cent) (WTo 2006:236) . Prces on major routes charged by these busnesses remaned under government control, untl that regulaton was relaxed n 1997.
A process of reorgansaton of the sector under government leadershp began n 2001. The arlnes then under the regulatory control of the cvl Avaton Admnstraton of chna (cAAc)-a total of 10-were consoldated nto three groups. Polcy had shfted, n other words, from a poston encouragng entry to one of a process of managed consoldaton. An mportant drver was the financal losses earned n the ndustry. Non-cAAc arlnes were not affected by the plans for consoldaton and a number contnued to operate.
Whle domestc polcy moved through a cycle from state monopoly to free entry to managed consoldaton, nternatonal polcy remaned conservatve. chnese polcymakers-n the blateral negotatons on market access that operate n nternatonal avaton-amed to balance market shares, sought commercal arrangements between carrers from both ends of a route, lmted the number of chnese and foregn arlnes desgnated to operate on a route and attempted to lmt entry by thrd-country carrers.
in July 2004, the Unted states and chna sgned a new blateral agreement, however, t was not the form of 'open-skes' agreement promoted by the Unted states. The agreement added substantal capacty to the routes, opened up more ctes for servces and ncreased the number of operators. in a speech on 2 december 2004, Us Under-secretary of Transportaton, Jeffrey shane, sad that the agreement 'was a huge step forward but dd not remove all constrants and left "a lot to be desred"'-manly because of the processes used to regulate access to the routes by carrers from each country. 4 Zhang and chen (2003) attrbute ths conservatve stance on nternatonal polcy to a percepton of a lack of compettveness of chnese arlnes, ncludng lack of management experence n competng n nternatonal markets, an expected mbalance between foregn arrvals (lkely to prefer ther own homecountry carrers) and chnese tourst departures, and nadequate arport capacty (although ths constrant s beng relaxed). dstrbuton dstrbuton of trade servces s composed of four man sub-sectors: commsson agents' servces, wholesalng, retalng and franchsng. Prncpal actvtes nclude resellng merchandse, accompaned by a varety of related subordnated servces, such as: nventory management; assembly, sortng and gradng of bulk lots; breakng bulk lots and redstrbutng nto smaller lots; delvery servces; refrgeraton, storage, warehousng and garage servces; sales promoton, marketng and advertsng, nstallaton and after-sales servces, ncludng mantenance and repar and tranng servces. chul et al. (2003) revew chna's experence n reform n ths sector.
Before the reform that began n 1978, state-owned firms or government bureaucraces domnated the retal and wholesale dstrbuton system and nearly all prces were government controlled. By 2000, n the consumer goods sector, state-owned firms accounted for 18.2 per cent of sales, collectvely owned firms for 15.6 per cent and the balance was n the hands of prvate firms or foregn-owned firms from hong kong, macau or Tawan (the last group accountng for 1.7 per cent).
Untl 1992, foregn nvestors were prohbted from operatng jont ventures or wholly owned enterprses n retalng or wholesalng. in that year, however, new regulatons permtted jont ventures (n whch the chnese partners were domnant and wth some lmtatons on operatons) n retalng n selected ctes. After that tme, local governments also took the ntatve to approve a number of jont ventures, but most were not mandated by the central government and were set up wthout permanent establshments-for example, through management contracts or leasng arrangements. A new regulaton n 1998 prohbted local governments from offerng approvals n ths sector. Further regulatory change n 1999 removed the geographcal restrctons on the locaton of jont ventures that the central government had prevously mposed.
Wholesalng was opened to foregn firms (operatng as mnorty foregn ownershp jont ventures) wthn a year of chna's WTo accesson. longer tme lmts appled to books, pharmaceutcal products, pestcdes and films (all three years after accesson) and fertlsers and ol products (five years), although salt and tobacco remaned exceptons. majorty foregn-owned jont ventures were permtted after two years. All geographcal restrctons on wholesalng and all restrctons on ownershp were to be removed wthn three years-that s, by 11 december 2004. in retalng, caps were retaned on the number of jont ventures n some larger ctes and specal economc zones. Geographcal restrctons were removed n the case of provncal captals. The same tme lmts appled n retalng to the groups of products to whch schedules appled n wholesalng. otherwse there was no constrant on the types of products that could be sold. All market access lmtatons were to be removed wthn three years (varous restrctons remaned for longer on operatons and ownershp of some types of chan stores and very large department stores).
chna fell behnd schedule n the mplementaton of these commtments (UsTr 2004). For example, n wholesalng, partcpaton was lmted to mnortyowned jont ventures beyond the december 2003 deadlne for a further relaxaton of that rule. Also a number of qualficaton requrements were mposed (for example, rules on sales volumes and asset values). The schedule was renstated by md 2004, when a commtment was made to also meet the next mlestone of 11 december 2004. Ths commtment was emboded n new regulatons, whch contnued to requre approval from the mnstry of commerce before servces could be provded. The UsTr (2004) remaned concerned, however, that there was no gudance on how the process of approvng applcatons would operate (the UsTr report s dated 11 december 2004). The same experence occurred n retal servces. By 2006, Us busnesses were referrng to dstrbuton as a 'success story' (Unted states-chna Busness councl 2006). The mnstry of commerce devolved the rght to grant lcences to provncal authortes and 'the problem largely dsappeared' (p.2). in some parts of dstrbuton, however, devoluton does not necessarly solve the problem. As the Unted states-chna Busness councl also ponts out (p.10), muncpal authortes can reject applcatons for new retal outlets on the grounds that otherwse local commerce would be 'dsrupted'. strctly, ths concern apples to domestc and foregn entrants.
WTo accesson shfted the drecton of reform to removng dscrmnaton aganst foregners. The assessment by chul et al. (2003) s that the deregulaton of the 1990s had larger mpacts on dstrbuton than those expected from WTo accesson, at least wthn the first couple of years. many large foregn retalers had already entered chna and ther geographcal spread was wdenng. Foregn partcpaton n ths perod had the advantage of provdng new methods (ncludng those related to nformaton technology) and dfferent retal formats, whch were examples of process nnovaton smlar to those observed n logstcs. reform had also contrbuted to competton, whch was assocated wth a fall n sales margns.
Conclusions
chna's experence to date n financal servces, transport, dstrbuton and telecommuncatons servces shows the mportance of dstngushng between key elements of the reform process.
The first step n chna has usually been to deregulate the domestc market. in some cases, restrctons on foregn partcpaton have not changed and, f they dd, the extent of dscrmnaton aganst foregners ncreased. in other cases, foregn partcpaton has been permtted, but usually wth restrctons on the form of establshment and the nature of operatons.
The second stage-mplemented n most cases after WTo accessonhas been to reduce the extent of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Ths stage also nvolves a schedule of steps, not an mmedate movement to full lberalsaton.
servces reform tends to be partal, for good publc polcy reasons. it nvolves a seres of steps, and n that respect chna's experence s not unque. But the problem s that dfferent sequences can be followed. in one of these-more lkely when a process of nternatonal negotatons drves reform-foregn entry receves prorty whle entry by domestc firms remans regulated. Ths approach rsks welfare losses from rent seekng by foregn provders, who form a new set of poltcal nterests affectng the next steps n the reform process.
in another sequence, evdent n chna's approach, the prorty n the first stages s gven to domestc deregulaton nstead of foregn entry. Ths avods the rsk of foregn rent seekng, but there are trade-offs. A focus on domestc deregulaton delays the recept of the benefits of foregn partcpaton (and, n the short term, dscrmnaton aganst foregn supplers could even ncrease). There s also a rsk that reform could stall, as ths sequence creates a new set of domestc nterests who oppose further reform.
The choce among these optons hnges on the ease of management of the varous nterests created as a consequence of the sequencng problemdomestc and foregn. chna's choce clearly has been to prortse domestc deregulaton before a wder openng. Ths process has been effectve n the sectors studed here, though wth substantal progress remanng to be acheved n some sectors, partcularly telecommuncatons and avaton.
WTo commtments play a key role n ether approach. even as n chna's case, wth a schedule of mplementaton, they help deal wth the rsk that partal reform could be captured and stalled. They set up a credble set of polcy commtments, whch tradng partners can montor and nfluence, as llustrated by the annual reportng of the UsTr. Further applcaton of WTo prncples avods a stuaton n whch putatve foregn entrants seek a share of the market and then argue to hold out further entry, as mght happen as a consequence. Ths argument s explaned n more detal by dee and Fndlay (2007) . our nterests n ths chapter are chna's commtments under the GATs and ther mplementaton. chna has, however, become an actve partcpant n blateral negotatons and n some of these agreements servces are ncluded. Antkewcz and Whalley (2005) revew chna's negotatons n preferental tradng arrangements. They pont out that, at least for the negotatons wth hong kong and macao n 2003, elgble supplers 'gan mproved access to chnese markets and sooner than those from other countres ' (p.1544) . in ths case, the contnung mplementaton of chna's WTo commtments could lmt the mpact of the preferental elements of these agreements, although firms from hong kong and macao have mportant 'first-mover' advantages. Antkewcz and Whalley (2005:1,544 ) also note the possblty that the effect of local regulatons could prove to be the 'bndng restrcton' and, n that case, commtments under the preferental agreements would be of lttle mportance.
The chna materal here s llustratve, but further emprcal work on the nature of servces sector polcy reform s valuable, ncludng work on the modellng of optons for reform. The calculaton of a set of ndces of servces polcy restrctveness n chna for a tme perod begnnng as early after the start of reforms as possble and contnung through to the present could be used to 1) confirm the mpressons of the path of reform, n partcular, ts twostep structure; 2) test hypotheses about the dfferences between sectors n the degrees of restrcton and the trajectores of ther removal, ncludng the rate at whch the WTo commtments are mplemented; 3) extend the optons for the desgn of experments n polcy modellng; and 4) dentfy the factors that add to or amelorate the rsks of stallng reform. A further applcaton of ths materal s to relate the changes n the ndex values to outcomes n servces markets and to varous performance ndcators, such as productvty mprovements, prce falls, qualty ncrements, nnovaton and so on, and thereby to assess the contrbuton of polcy reform to these changes.
Notes
1 Generally, the value of d wll be less than one, snce some restrctons that apply to foregn entry do not apply to domestc firms. For more dscusson of the calculaton of the ndces, see the papers n Fndlay and Warren (2000) . 2 kox and lejour (2004) revew a number of other studes that examne the effect of reform of cross-border trade. Whalley (2004) , n hs revew of the emprcal work, hghlghts the complementarty of openness n factor markets wth lberalsaton of cross-border transactons but pays less attenton to the sequencng questons examned here. Walmsley and Wnters (2003) 
investment restrctons-ncumbent
The score s nversely proportonal to the maxmum drect equty partcpaton permtted n a specfic domestc telecom operator. if there s no operatorspecfic restrcton, the score wll be the same as the score for general restrcton. a a in crcumstances where no new operator s allowed, a score of one s recorded for domestc and foregn ndces, whereas n crcumstances where new lcences are ssued only to domestc new entrants, a score of one s recorded for the foregn ndex only. Table A6 
